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Abstract—In this article, we provide a summary of recent
efforts towards achieving Internet geolocation securely, i.e.,
without allowing the entity being geolocated to cheat about
its own geographic location. Cheating motivations arise from
many factors, including impersonation (in the case locations are
used to reinforce authentication), and gaining location-dependent
benefits. In particular, we provide a technical overview of Client
Presence Verification (CPV) and Server Location Verification
(SLV)—two recently proposed techniques designed to verify the
geographic locations of clients and servers in realtime over the
Internet. Each technique addresses a wide range of adversarial
tactics to manipulate geolocation, including the use of IP-hiding
technologies like VPNs and anonymizers, as we now explain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet Geolocation is the process of determining the
geographic location of an Internet-connected device. Secure
geolocating of a web client (a client visiting a website) is
useful for location-aware authentication, location-aware access
control, location-based online voting, location-based social
networking, and fraud reduction.
From the client’s perspective, geolocating the remote server
can provide higher assurance to the server’s identity, and jus-
tify conducting certain sensitive transactions, e.g., those requir-
ing certain privacy measures or requiring data sovereignty [1].
Independent of server and client geolocation, geolocating
network intermediate systems (e.g., routers) can also be useful
for purposes such as monitoring [2] and network mapping [3].
This article provides a technical overview on two recent
approaches for secure location verification of clients and
servers over the Internet, respectively CPV and SLV. Both
techniques are based on network measurements, where delays
are measured from trusted network nodes dubbed verifiers, and
are analyzed in realtime to verify physical presence inside a
prescribed geographic region. We explain the threat model of
both techniques, how they mitigate against known adversarial
tactics, how they adapt to various network dynamics, and what
distinguishes them from other geolocation approaches.
II. GEOLOCATION BACKGROUND
This section provides a background on how Internet ge-
olocation works, and the security limitations associated with
common practices. Many academic geolocation methods have
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Fig. 1. Snapshots of the Flagfox browser extension.
been proposed, but there have been very limited deployment in
practice. As of this writing, most of the geolocation conducted
in practice relies on the clients’ IP address or GPS coordinates
of hand-held devices, as explained below.
A. Geolocation in Practice
There are several methods for device geolocation over the
Internet. If the device belongs to a user that is acting as a
web client (i.e., visiting a website), the Geolocation API is a
W3C standard that enables browsers to obtain location infor-
mation of the device they are running on, and communicate
it to a webserver. Servers request location coordinates using
Javascript as follows:
if(navigator.geolocation) {
navigator.geolocation.getCurrentPosition(success, error
, geoOptions);
} else {
console.log("Geolocation is not supported on this
browser.");
}
The geolocation methods a browser uses are left to the browser
vendor’s discretion. Most major browsers rely on the following
in varying orders (i.e., when one fails, the next is tried): GPS,
WiFi Positioning System (WPS), IP address-based location
look-ups, or cell-tower triangulation of mobile devices. The
location of an IP address can be obtained from, e.g., publicly
available routing information or public registries, such as
whois. Many IP location service providers (commercial and
free) maintain look-up tables to instantly map IP addresses to
locations. Such static tablulation methods may take long times
to reflect changes or IP address re-assignments, which occur
quite often for client geolocation to be up to date (studies were
conducted to confirm this [4]). IP address based geolocation
can however be reliable for benign server geolocation. Flagfox
is an example Firefox extension that visually indicates a flag
of the country corresponding to the IP address resolution of
the URL (see Fig 1).
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Fig. 2. Snapshots of the Fake Location extension—an example browser
extension allowing users to fake their locations.
From a security perspective, none of the above techniques
is resilient to adversarial manipulation. When the geolocation
API is in use, the server normally makes no effort in geolocat-
ing the client device; it rather trusts the browser-communicated
coordinates, which can easily be forged on the fly before being
sent to the server. Example Firefox extensions that enable
forgery include Fake Location (see Fig 2) and Location Guard;
both enable a user to specify where in the world they would
like to appear to be at. If the server relies on tabulation
methods to geolocate the client (instead of asking the browser
for its coordinates), the common practice of clients hiding their
own IP addresses behind proxies and anonymizers comes into
play.
B. Geolocation in the Literature
A wide set of techniques can be used, mostly for a server to
geolocate clients [5]. These enable a server to infer a client’s
geographic location from, e.g., hints obtained from browser-
generated HTTP headers (such as preferred language or time
zone). Locations can also be obtained through crowd-sourcing,
e.g., by interpolating a device’s location from its proximity to
nearby devices (phones) with known GPS locations.
Another class of Internet geolocation approaches is based
on network measurements. Similar to GPS triangulations that
are based on the delays between the receiver and satellites,
measurement-based techniques also aim to locate devices
(clients or server) by estimating their distance from landmarks
in the network with known locations. These landmarks mea-
sure network delays from themselves to the device, typically
identified by its IP address, and map these delays to geographic
distances. The accuracy of such mapping however is not any-
where near that of mapping satellite delays to distances, and
is thus the primary source of inaccuracies in such techniques.
Still, measurement-based geolocation is generally considered
more accurate than methods like tabulation-based geolocation.
From the security point of view, although most of the
above methods are positioned as resilient to evasion, exam-
ination has shown otherwise. Delay-increasing attacks can
allow an adversary to distort its perceived location [6]. Delay-
decreasing was also studied, e.g., by manipulating ICMP ping
and traceroute as they fail to preserve the integrity of
timing measurements. Combining both attacks, an adversary
can forge the calculated location to an accuracy of a few tens
of kilometres relative to a target desired location [7].
III. CLIENT PRESENCE VERIFICATION (CPV)
CPV [8] is a measurement-based technique designed to
verify the geographic locations of web users (clients hence-
forth) over the Internet. The client is assumed to be motivated
to misrepresent its location, e.g., to gain location-dependent
benefits. CPV’s design takes into consideration various adver-
sarial location-forging tactics, including delay manipulations
and IP-hiding technologies like VPNs and anonymizers. CPV
does not rely fundamentally on the clients’ IP addresses, nor
does it determine geographic locations. Rather, it verifies an
asserted (unverified) location, typically made by a client. The
client’s location could be asserted using, e.g., the client’s GPS
coordinates, the client’s IP address, or even explicitly such
asking the user to fill-in their street address in an online form
during login.
To verify location assertions, CPV relies on an infrastruc-
ture of geographically scattered nodes, dubbed verifiers (e.g.,
virtual private, or cloud-based servers). The technique works
as follows. When a client visits a website and asserts the
geographic location from which he/she is currently browsing,
three verifiers surrounding the asserted location are selected.
The verifiers measure (in realtime) network delays between
themselves and the client’s browser, and analyze these delays
to corroborate that the client is present somewhere inside
the triangle determined by their (the verifiers) geographic
locations. Because the verifiers cannot pinpoint where exactly
the client is within the triangle, the size of the triangle is the
verification granularity.
A. Secure One-way Delay Estimation
The verifiers do not measure round-trip times (RTT) be-
tween themselves and the client. They rather estimate the
smaller of the forward and reverse one-way delays (OWDs)
between each of them and the client. The larger OWD is
discarded because propagation delays between two network
nodes are bounded by the physical distance between them,
so a smaller OWD measurement is a better representation to
the geographic distance between both nodes than the larger—
the larger must have been affected by other factors such as
network congestion or circuitous routing.
To measure the OWD between a verifier and the client,
CPV does not rely on standard OWD-estimation protocols like
OWAMP (RFC 4656), as those require honest client cooper-
ation, e.g., client clock synchronization and honest reporting
of delays. As such, CPV relies on the Minimum-Pairs (MP)
protocol [9]. MP requires the three verifiers, A, B, and C,
to first synchronize their clocks, and pre-share cryptographic
keys to ensure operational integrity.
Through Javascript, the client’s browser is first directed to
establish a WebSocket (RFC 6455) connection to the three
Verifiers, which are chosen based on the client’s asserted
location. Verifier A begins by a sending a cryptographically-
protected timestamp (in millisecond precision) to the client,
which the browser forwards to the other two verifiers. On
receiving this, verifier B calculates the propagation time from
A −→ client −→ B, and likewise when the timestamp is received
by C. Verifiers B and C then follow suit, taking turns in
sending timestamps. When all three verifiers are done ex-
changing timestamp messages, they will have six delay values
as follows:
• A −→ client −→ B.
• A −→ client −→ C.
• B −→ client −→ A.
• B −→ client −→ C.
• C −→ client −→ A.
• C −→ client −→ B.
Between each pair of verifiers, e.g., between {A −→ client −→
B} and {B −→ client −→ A}, the verifiers exclude the larger
OWD, and solve a system of three equations simultaneously
for an estimate to the smaller OWD between the client and
each verifier. That is, if the smaller of the forward and reverse
OWD between the client and A, B, and C respectively is a,
b, c, then (note: = sign here is used to indicate mathematical
equality rather than an assignment operator):
• a+ b = min(AtB,BtA)
• a+ c = min(AtC,CtA)
• b+ c = min(BtC,CtB)
where AtB is the delay A −→ target client −→ B, and so on.
Analysis of MP’s accuracy showed that the protocol is likely
to provide more accurate estimates to the smaller OWD than
simply using half the RTT [9].
B. Corroborating Presence Inside the Triangle
In order to avoid potential inaccuracies from delay-to-
distance mapping, the calculated OWDs are not mapped to
distances. They are rather compared to the smaller OWDs
between the verifiers themselves, which are measured and
updated periodically in a background process, independent of
whether or not a client is currently being verified. Assuming
x = min(AB,BA) is the smaller of the forward and reverse
OWDs between verifiers A and B directly (not to be confused
with min(AtB,BtA) from the previous section), and likewise
y = min(BC,CB) and z = min(AC,CA), then the client’s
asserted location is accepted as inside the triangle if:
area(4xab)+area(4ybc)+area(4zca) ≤ area(4xyz) +
Such that area(4xab) is the area of that triangle calculated
from its side lengths x, a, and b. The value of  is used to
account for the two extra access network traversals occurring
at the client when the timestamps propagate from a verifier to
the client to another verifier (see Section III-C for setting this
value).
Iterative Delay Measurement. To account for abrupt delay
spikes or network irregularities, the above process of OWD
calculations and comparison with those between the verifiers
is iteratively repeated, e.g., 20 times. If the condition is met for
the majority of the conducted iterations, the location assertion
is accepted.
C. CPV Calibration
There are several parameters that tune CPV’s reaction to
events. The most important three are  (in Section III-B), n,
which is the number of delay measurement iterations, and τ ,
which is the fraction of those iterations that must pass (i.e.,
the condition is met) for the client’s asserted location to be
accepted. This calibration should take place before the location
verification process begins. To do that, the three verifiers may
use network nodes that they know as a ground truth are
inside the triangle. From the network delays of these nodes,
the verifiers compute values for the above mentioned three
parameters, and then run CPV to verify the client’s location.
D. Hindering Illicit Traffic Relaying
In an attempt to defeat geolocation, a middlebox (like a
proxy server or a VPN gateway) that is physically inside
the triangle can be specifically customized to filter out the
verifiers’ timestamps from the client’s traffic and forward them
to the verifiers on behalf of the client. This threat against CPV
is exacerbated by the presence of numerous cheap public VPN
providers whose primary service is to enable subscribers to
evade geolocation technologies.
Techniques like CPV can mitigate against this by adapting
known Proof-of-Work techniques [10]. The verifiers generate
a cryptographic client puzzle with each timestamp message,
which the client’s browser must solve before forwarding the
message (puzzle solution and timestamp) to the other two
verifiers. The puzzles must be easy to solve so that they do
not (1) overwhelm the client with high processing costs, and
(2) overshadow the network propagation delays.
In the case of a middlebox connected to many simultaneous
(i.e., cheating) clients, the middlebox will choose to either
solve these puzzles on behalf of the clients, or forward them
to the clients. In the latter case, the network delay between
the middlebox and the client will get added to the time
the verifiers observe for location verification, which results
in CPV correctly detecting the client’s absence from the
respective triangle. It is thus in the middlebox’s interest to
choose the former case—solving the puzzles on behalf of
the clients. However, this means that as more clients are
connected, the middlebox will have to solve more puzzles.
When these puzzles begin to accumulate, they will increase
queueing delays, which contribute to the delays observed by
the verifiers, eventually causing CPV to reject the location
assertions of all middlebox-connected clients.
In this model, there are two main parameters contributing to
the puzzle queueing rate at the middlebox: the puzzle difficulty
and the middlebox’s computational resources (e.g., processor
clock frequency and number of processing cores). Queueing
analysis [10] shows that the puzzle difficulty has a higher
impact on the rate of puzzle queueing than the middlebox’s
computational power. This analysis suggests that this puzzle
mechanism will be effective to hinder illicit middlebox relay-
ing.
E. Evaluation Results
CPV was evaluated using PlanetLab—a distributed testbed
for Internet measurement research and network experiments—
using 80 planetlab nodes in North America. Three of the nodes
were selected to act as verifiers, and the remaining 77 acted as
clients. Some of the 77 nodes were inside the triangle (recall:
the verification triangle determined by the three verifiers),
while others were outside. All 77 nodes carried out the
protocol with the verifiers simultaneously to get their locations
verified. Knowing the ground-truth of which nodes are inside
and which are outside (the geographic locations of PlanetLab
nodes are publicly disclosed on PlanetLab’s website), we can
count the number False Rejects (nodes inside the triangle
identified by CPV as outside) and False Accepts. The process
is repeated after choosing a different triangle (a different set
of three nodes to act as verifiers), again counting false rejects
and false accepts. In total, 34 triangles where chosen. Triangles
were chosen to be nearly equilateral (physically), with inside
angles ranging from 50-70 degrees (0.87-1.22 radians). The
smallest triangle had an area equivalent to a circle of radius
100km, and largest 400km.
When the inside nodes are not too close to the triangle’s
sides (i.e., away from the closest side by at least 10% of its
length), CPV resulted in a total of 1.0% false accepts and 2.0%
false rejects [8]. These results were obtained when 600 CPV
iterations (see Section III-B) were performed with each client.
The results were not much different when only 100 iterations
were performed, where the false accept rate increased only to
1.1% and the false reject rate remained unchanged. However,
when only 10 iterations were performed, false accepts and
false rejects were at 2.1% and 4.1% respectively.
Testing was later repeated to assess the effect of WiFi access
networks on CPV’s efficacy [11]. WiFi access networks often
have higher delays and delay jitters. A different evaluation
technique was used, as the PlanetLab infrastructure used above
involved nodes connected using wired access networks. To
model WiFi clients, 802.11 delay models from the literature
were used to generate the last-mile delays, which were added
(i.e., arithmetic summation) to the delay traces collected from
PlanetLab. Since higher network delays for nodes inside the
triangles may result in higher false rejects, the generated
802.11 delays were only added to the the delays of inside
nodes to create the most stressful testing situation. 802.11
networks employ slotted retransmissions. The delays were
generated such that each slot is 20 µsec, the propagation delay
from the device to the wireless gateway is 1 µsec, and that
four other wireless devices were continuously competing for
the wireless media along with each wireless CPV client. With
these parameters, CPV’s false accepts was at 2% and false
rejects at 4%. Although CPV’s efficacy was affected by the
WiFi access network, increasing the number of iterations can
improve the results; see [11].
F. Live Demo
A live demo of CPV is currently running on http://cpv.
ccsl.carleton.ca. This link hits a webserver in Ottawa, Canada,
which enables clients to verify if they are present inside a US-
based triangle determined by verifiers in San Francisco, Las
Vegas, and San Diego. The verifiers are provided by hosting
services DigitalOcean, ServerPoint, and M5 Hosting. Each
VM has a 500MB RAM, and runs Ubuntu 16.04. NTP is used
to synchronize their clocks. Additionally, each verifier issues
an NTP query every 30 minutes using the ntpq utility to
calculate the clock offset with the other two verifiers, which is
added to the calculated OWDs between the verifiers for more
accurate OWD estimates. Each verifier issues a timestamp
to the other two verifiers every six seconds for direct OWD
measurements between the verifiers.
A Java implementation of a CPV verifier runs on top of a
lightweight custom-written WebSocket server, which is also
implemented in Java. When a location verification request
is initiated, the verifiers first check that it was issued from
the authentic server (the one based in Ottawa in that demo
implementation), because this server digitally signs connec-
tion IDs when they are issued. Additionally, each exchanged
timestamp message between the verifiers through the client is
corroborated using an MD5-based HMAC (a stronger HMAC
is recommended to be used in practice). For the currently
running demo, eight delay-measuring iterations are performed,
once every 300ms. When all iterations are performed, the
verifiers send the measured delays back to the Ottawa server,
which processes the result and returns it to the browser as
a jQuery response. No client puzzles are implemented yet in
this demo as of this writing, nor any automatic calibration of
CPV’s parameters (Section III-C). Instead, the main server has
manually set parameters of  = 10ms and τ = 0.7, which are
static and used across all clients.
IV. SERVER LOCATION VERIFICATION (SLV)
Analogous to CPV but on the server side, SLV [12] works
by finding evidence of a server’s physical presence inside a
geographic region by measuring the server’s network delays.
A browser typically communicates with an SLV Manager,
which orchestrates a network of server location verifiers. The
challenges faced in doing so are quite different from verifying
clients: (1) clients do not normally have the ability to write
and run code on the server, whereas that was easily achievable
by the server on the client typically using Javascript; (2) The
common physical distribution of webcontent using Content
Distribution Networks (CDNs) and replication technologies
begs the questions: Of the multiple physical servers that may
serve client content, which such servers should be selected
to geograpihcally locate (verify), in order to provide a useful
server-authentication service? And how should that machine
be identified?
The answers to these questions depend on the threat model
and the application for which geolocation is to be used. Since
the goal of SLV is to reinforce server authentication, the
implementation of SLV takes the view that the first machine
that terminates the client’s TCP (and TLS) handshake is the
most critical one. The protection provided from verifying that
first machine would be comparable to that provided by TLS,
e.g., in the cases where the browser fetches content from
multiple machines some of which are not TLS-protected (i.e.,
a page with mixed content).
For deciding on the mechanism used to identify machines, it
is important to dissect Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) and server
impersonation attacks. In MitM attacks, an adversary hijacks
network traffic intended to the authentic server, and relays it
to the authentic server with or without modification. Hijacking
could occur on several layers of the network stack, as follows.
Note that using uncompromised TLS protects against the
following hijacking cases; the value of using server location to
reinforce server authentication is more profound for non TLS-
enabled websites or to catch attacks against the TLS system.
• Case 1: Attacker’s machine has a different IP address
than the authentic server. In upper layers, phishing and
pharming attacks are prominent traffic hijacking exam-
ples; the outbound traffic from the client has a different
IP address than that of the authentic server. If the browser
submits the domain name of the visited website to the
SLV Manager, the Manager may resolve it to a different
IP address than that seen by the browser (which could
also occur benignly in the cases of CDNs). Verifying
the geographic location of that IP address then becomes
useless to the browser because a MitM adversary would
go undetected. It is thus important to have the browser
resolve a domain and submit the IP address to the SLV
Manager.
• Case 2: Attacker’s machine has same IP address as
authentic server. In lower layer hijacking (such as MAC
table poisoning and ARP spoofing) and in BGP spoofing,
outbound traffic from the client has the same destination
IP address as that of the authentic server. Such tactics are
based on routing manipulation, so that traffic intended
to the authentic server’s IP address reaches a different
“network location” (versus geographic location), which
corresponds to the attacker’s machine.
In comparison to upper layers, lower layer hijacking attacks
tend to be more scalable, affecting larger proportion of clients.
For MAC table poisoning and ARP spoofing, the closer
the attacker’s machine to the authentic server’s network, the
more the affected clients. Likewise, BGP spoofing can cause
traffic hijacking at a global scale [13]. This implies that as
with higher layer traffic hijacking attacks discussed above,
identifying the server by its IP address will likely allow the
SLV Manager to detect if the browser-intended machine is at
a different geographic location than that asserted, e.g., from a
static location mapping previously obtained for that IP address.
Revisiting the above questions, this means that if SLV
Fig. 3. Server Location Verification (SLV) using network measurements from
three verifiers (A, B, and C) to a server. Best viewed in color. Map data:
Google, INEGI.
targets the IP address (as resolved by the browser) of the
first machine that the client initially handshakes (regardless of
whether the browser will be instructed to fetch other content
from different places later in the session), it can detect most
of the above server impersonation attacks.
A. Verification Mechanism
After obtaining an unverified server location assertion,
three verifiers surrounding that location are selected. The
verifiers measure network RTTs to the server over several
layers, including Application using HTTP request-response
times and Transport using TCP handshake responses. By
means of comparing these delays with the delays between the
verifiers, each pair of verifiers then verify whether the server
is physically present inside the circle whose diameter is the
physical distance between the verifier pair, and center is the
midpoint between them (see Fig. 3).
B. Evaluation Results
Pilot testing of ∼200 experiments was conducted on SLV
using PlanetLab, half of which were true location assertions
made by servers and the other half were false assertions. As
with CPV, the rates of false rejects and false accepts were
the fundamental evaluation parameters. SLV resulted in 0%
false accepts and 2.4% false rejects [12]. Although the false
reject rate may seem high for some applications, it can be
improved by proper selection of verifiers, e.g., those with
sufficient network bandwidth and processing resources.
C. SLV Browser Extension
We have built a Firefox browser extension to reinforce TLS
by integrating the webserver’s verified physical location as
described above into the server authentication process. The
extension sends the IP address of the server to the SLV
Manager, and receives the location verification result. The
extension uses FlagFox to obtain an assertion (unverified)
for the server’s location. It also displays a flag in the URL
(recall: Fig. 1), adding to that a green tick mark or a red cross
indicating whether the location asserted by FlagFox is true
(according to SLV’s verification) or not. This process takes a
few seconds to execute, during which a throbber is displayed
by the flag instead. Note that such visual cues are only meant
as visual feedback (in prototypes), and not an indication that
we would expect end-users to take decisions upon. See below
for how policies could be implemented to automatically take
decisions on behalf of users.
Server location pinning in the browser. To avoid having
the user interpret these icons, the SLV extension is supported
with a location pinning feature, whereby a browser saves
that a website (identified by its URL) was previously verified
to host content from this geographic location (analogous to
key pinning [14]). Although location verification is preformed
based on the IP address (recall: the SLV Manager only receives
an IP address from the browser), location pinning in the
browser is based on the domain name. Upon receiving the
verification result for a website, its location gets pinned only
if the result was positive, i.e., the location was verified as true.
This operation follows a trust on first use (TOFU) concept.
In general, for interpreting a received verification result,
the SLV extension checks if that location (to some degree
of geographic precision) was pinned before for that website.
The result of the operation is threefold: Critical, Suspicious,
or Unsuspicious. The first is when the verification result
for a previously pinned location was negative. A Suspicious
outcome is when location verification fails, but no location
was pinned before for that website. Finally, an Unsuspicious
outcome is when location verification passes for a domain that
was not previously pinned. Note that these are only meant
to illustrate how a client might utilize SLV, but we expect
different applications would make different choices.
Such outcomes could result in the browser automatically
taking decisions, e.g., through a policy-based engine. An
example would be to instruct the browser to block/terminate
the connection for all Critical outcomes of the user’s personal
banking website. Such a language is subject to more research
scrutiny, and is not yet part of the above SLV extension.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article gave a technical overview of recent advance-
ments in the field of secure geolocation over the Internet.
Two technologies were explained, CPV and SLV, to address
client and server geolocation respectively. Both rely on net-
work timing measurements for secure location verification,
taking into consideration safety measures to limit adversarial
manipulations. Of the wide variety of applications that may
benefit from secure location information of clients and servers,
reinforcing authentication (i.e., location-aware authentication)
for both ends remains an important example. Future research
on CPV and SLV includes further enhancing their accuracy
(in terms of the false reject and accept rates) and efficiency
for large scale deployments in practice.
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